

# TEXTE ZUR KUNST



März 2016 26. Jahrgang Heft 101  
€ 16,50 | D | S 25,-

25 Jahre  
TEXTE ZUR KUNST

## POLARITIES POLARITÄT

6

PREFACE

34

ET SOUS LA PLAGE...?

Philipp Felsch interviews Timothy Brennan  
on the state of left theory

56

HELMUT DRAXLER

ALWAYS POLARIZE?

Conditions and limitations of a model of argumentation

70

LIBERTY, EQUALITY, SECURITY

Four questions for Carolin Emcke

76

ENTER THE VOID

Roy Scranton and @LilInternet on hyperreality  
and reflexive narrative

98

DANIEL COLUCCIELLO BARBER AND DAVIS RHODES

THE TERROR WITHIN

106

ANTEK WALCZAK

GLOBALLY POSITIONED

116

GABRIELE WERNER

HEIMAT

Notes on the enduring renaissance of an idea

4

VORWORT

35

ET SOUS LA PLAGE...?

Timothy Brennan im Interview mit Philipp Felsch  
zum Stand linker Theorie

57

HELMUT DRAXLER

ALWAYS POLARIZE?

Bedingungen und Grenzen einer Argumentationsfigur

71

FREIHEIT, GLEICHHEIT, SICHERHEIT

Vier Fragen an Carolin Emcke

77

ENTER THE VOID

Roy Scranton und @LilInternet im Gespräch über  
Hyperrealität und reflexive Narrative

99

DANIEL COLUCCIELLO BARBER UND DAVIS RHODES

THE TERROR WITHIN

107

ANTEK WALCZAK

GLOBAL POSITIONIERT

117

GABRIELE WERNER

HEIMAT

Anmerkungen zur dauernden Renaissance eines Begriffs

BILDSTRECKE / IMAGE SPREAD

129

GERHARD RICHTER

NEW DEVELOPMENT

143

NATIONALE WERTE

Sven Lütticken über die Debatte zum Kulturgutschutzgesetz



Margaret Thatcher und /  
and Ronald Reagan, Camp  
David, 1984

This issue opens with a proposal that, in itself, is likely to polarize: examining the rise of poststructuralist theory since the 1970s, the American literary scholar Timothy Brennan, following from his extended work on the subject, links the success of this discourse to its compatibility with entrepreneurialism. He shows that an arc can be traced – from Foucault through Hardt and Negri to today's post-humanist thinkers – of positions that, in his view, do not so much offer different critical approaches, but rather constitute a tradition that carefully avoids concrete demands, particularly in regards to the individual against the state. It is a way of thinking, he notes, that took an “entire generation eager to make a difference in its fight against neoliberal dominance out of commission.”

A decade after the publication of Brennan's key book on this issue, “Wars of Position,” what can we learn from these observations? Befitting our issue's framing theme, Brennan, here interviewed by Philipp Fetsch (author of “Der lange Sommer der Theorie”) makes a case against a vague and relativist theoretical habitus, against acting in perpetual fear of polemics.

**PHILIPP FELSCH:** In your 2006 book “Wars of Position: The Cultural Politics of Left and Right,” you contrast a world of rising inequality, political extremism, and violence with a cultural Left cut off from the theories that would enable it to articulate dissent. Would you say that this diagnosis is still valid today – ten years later?

**TIMOTHY BRENNAN:** It would have to be modified slightly. The book was written as a reaction to the emphasis – in the Anglo-American academy – on the psychoanalytic subject, the ageless subject of history that predominated in the 1980s and '90s. I note this specific region because of a certain imperial legacy, and the fact that what emerged in the British and US academic context during that time found its way to other parts of Europe and the Commonwealth. What we have today is a hypertrophy of nominal, radical thinking that expresses itself as the political immediacy of theory. We see this in, for example, the Invisible

Committee's "The Coming Insurrection," or Jodi Dean's "The Communist Horizon," writings by the Krisis group, and in articles within postcolonial theory that explicitly talk about Abu Ghraib or the assault on habeas corpus in US law. So there is a very deliberate attempt, I would say, in one wing of humanities theory, to make up for yesterday's discursive distance from actual struggle in order instead to invoke things in terms of the "now" with the idea that theory is, in a sense, politics realized. Yet there is, within this gesture to immediacy, also a number of new formalisms. One might think of distant reading in literary studies, or surface reading: a new formalism in poetics that aims to get us beyond a discussion of politics, privileging instead a direct experience of the aesthetic artifact. There are many different trends going on. I would say that this slippage into a radical rhetoric of political immediacy is, in general, the biggest change.

**FELSCH:** Before coming back to the contemporary situation, I would like to talk about the constellation that you diagnosed in 2006 – a very intriguing diagnosis, indeed – where, in "Wars of Position," you argue that in order to understand the political dilemma of the cultural Left, one should look to the second half of the '70s, and to the intellectual and political regime that came into being around this time and is still in place today. You refer to the years between 1975 and 1980 as "the turn." What exactly happened at that time?

**BRENNAN:** Well, a number of things. The dates that I've mentioned are chosen advisedly: 1975 represents the formal end of the Vietnam War, and 1980 represents the coming to power of Ronald Reagan in the United States. Margaret Thatcher

assumed office actually just a year earlier in the UK. So there was a perceived, and I think also actual, turn to the right within popular culture as an attempt to redefine the dominant value system within the media and in public arts institutions. And this found its way into the academy as well. So you had a generation of people who, in an earlier period, were often members of far-left political organizations, who were protesting the war or joining trade unions or becoming communists, but who, in the waning of these radical energies of the 1970s with the end of the Vietnam War, now found themselves in positions of relative power and authority within the university. So only five years later, as graduate students or assistant professors, they were facing this immense right-wing shift in the general culture. Think of the pressures on intellectuals who saw themselves as dissidents, who did not openly in any way embrace American capitalism, but who were nevertheless involved in the process of professionalization. They needed to find a way to develop a vocabulary of the radical and the oppositional that would not harm their professional prospects. Maybe this is too mercenary a way of putting it, yet that was an element.

**FELSCH:** You describe the shift that happened as one from a politics of belief to a politics of being. At the same time, you speak of a "culture of belief." Can you say why, in the political and intellectual arena of our time, the idea of a "culture of belief" is widely repressed?

**BRENNAN:** It's a very complicated question. Let's attack it from the point of view of intellectual legacies first. I think that traditions are chosen as active influences rather than environmentally




imposed on subjects, as Foucault would have it with his notion of an episteme: a kind of discursive framework that one unconsciously enters into and is forced to speak through. It would seem that there was a conscious effort on the part of radicals in the '68ist moment to find intellectual predecessors who were not tainted with what they considered to be the crimes of communism. So a major factor underlying the crisis that I attempt to diagnose in "Wars of Position" is an inability to deal with the history of communism and the Far Left adequately – that is, to learn from it, to take on its positions (the ones that deserve to be taken on), to correct them, and to build on them.

**FELSCH:** And how does this connect to the transition from a politics of belief to a politics of being?

**BRENNAN:** From the philosophical point of view, one form of retaliation employed by Europe's intellectual Right during the generalization of communism and the popular fronts (the broader culture of the Left and so on) was to shift the emphasis from epistemology to ontology in the work of phenomenology. Heidegger is obviously

central to all of these ideas that, in the 1960s and '70s, came to be known as poststructuralism in France before arriving in the United States, where people like Derrida, who was never very popular in France, made his name – which I think is significant. The politics of being reflects a shift to a meditation on the "enigma" of being and the aesthetic wonder of a received, rather than analyzed, existence – one shorn of any critical intelligence that might interpret it. And it's not so much that an earlier philosophical mode of active critique (from critical theory and the golden age of interwar left Hegelian thought in figures like Brecht, Bloch, and Eisenstein, or later Lefebvre and Fanon) is being confronted and defeated by alternative positions; rather epistemological debate is simply no longer on the agenda. Incidentally, we see this same gesture being repeated in posthumanist discourse in the contemporary moment, which wants to do much more than simply call into question human arrogance in light of the ecological devastation that humans as a species have wrought, but really wants to get away from any notion of critical thought in any form. I am thinking here, for example, of Anne-Lise François's dark ecology that urges people "do nothing" and contemplates the happy end of the species; or Bruno Latour's pernicious (and astoundingly Eurocentric) work on man/machine hybrids which, among other things, appeals to an "end of denunciation"; or speculative realists like Quentin Meillassoux, who wants to claim that "absolute reality is an entity without thought" even though one might well ask, how does he know this "without thought"?

Another factor in this shift from a politics of belief to a politics of being has been the importance of race and gender in the United States.



Michel Foucault im Gespräch mit / in conversation with Noam Chomsky, 1971

Both the Civil Rights movement and the efforts and successes of feminism are, if I can put it this way, screamingly important in the struggle for greater equality (legal and otherwise) in the United States and in Britain. And yet, if we look at the outcome, the relative successes (with much backsliding) of those movements of identity, we come to see that the current corporate system can tolerate more equality for women and people of color, but it cannot tolerate the elimination of class differences. These struggles on behalf of identity were gestures that were permitted under the official discourses of the time. They, too, were a form of legitimate dissident position. But in the postwar period – and this continues to the present day – there was (in the US at least) little protection for one's rights as a member of an economic class (for instance, no quotas for working-class kids applying to


the university). And even more so, people can, under US law, still be fired for holding a position considered to be communist. So these are some of the things that were on my mind while talking about that shift.

**FELSCH:** Essentially, your book articulates a harsh critique of poststructuralism, or French theory. Could you elaborate a little bit, on the level of content, or what notions, in what way French theory is aligned with the dominant regime of Western liberalism?

**BRENNAN:** Okay. "French theory" is kind of a funny phrase though – in the sense that we've somehow allowed the work of Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Lacan, and perhaps Lyotard, to constitute "French theory," but do not include Bourdieu, Régis Debray, Guy Debord, or Michèle Mattelart ...

FELSCH: Henri Lefebvre ...

BRENNAN: ... yes, and so on. The same kinds of exclusion continue, of course, in the recent attention to Rancière, Badiou, Nancy, Agamben, and Negri (the last two, although Italian, having apprenticed in the narrower version of French theory, or lived and studied in France). So it's a particular "selective tradition," to borrow a phrase from Raymond Williams, that I'm referring to; it's a particular theory that was mobilized, within France, precisely to counter the legacies of the traditional French Left of the interwar era by drawing on figures of the intellectual Right, people who were associated (and I do not mean only Heidegger) with Nazism or with a kind of anti-humanist secular theology. It is based, again, on a turn to ontology and immanence, and dedicated to the "detranscendentalizing of Man" in order to arrest the credible gains in the name of the human by the organized Left of the era. So what are these positions? I think that there is, first of all, the position of the "agency-less," the subject of history absent of any agency. In Foucault's wonderful book "Discipline and Punish" it's very striking that the epistemological shifts, all of the epistemic ruptures that he's describing in history, are ones that are attributable to no movement, no person, no set of influences: What ideas were mobilized to bring about the shift from the regime of punishment to that of ethical and moral control? Under what conditions was the carceral society first proposed? Foucault is very careful not to say. So this would be something that would perfectly coincide with the "impersonal" of bourgeois ideology: the notion that people are interchangeable, that collateral fallouts in bombing campaigns are acceptable.



Francis Fukuyama

And there is this notion that comes up in the sort of neo-Deleuzian writing of Negri and Hardt that suggests there is no need for a leftist organization seeking to make claims upon a state, far less to take over the state. That globalization is actually a genuinely populist form of expression arising from the pressure of the multitude below; that revolution is not a future goal, but something that has already happened, interstitially; that – if we think (as they do) that the claims of an "end of history" by Francis Fukuyama and others are not merely the prejudices of a state department intellectual, but are actually describing our current situation – we must instead look for ways to creatively devise new forms of subjectivity within the interstices of capital.

But what we find, here, are precisely the ideas that are laid out in managerial training manuals. People in the advisory role – Gramsci called them “the organic intellectuals of capital” – are not talking about things like efficiency or saving or greater productivity. They are talking about playing games, fucking with the categories, about inventiveness, creativity, the imagination. This constantly replicated ethical language that poststructuralism reproduced, about mobility, about never sitting still, about not taking a position, about always exploring creativity within ambiguity: this is the language of capital. This is the kind of thing you’d find in writing for the *New York Times* on the dynamism of American business. That said, I don’t think that the complicity is conscious; rather, there is simply a desire to find a radical rhetoric that does not replicate the sins of the leftist past.

Here, what you have is the repetition of ideas formulated in the European political past, but now shorn of their historical contexts, of their legacies in an intellectual history that comes with potentially alienating associations. So one, rather naively, even gullibly, is passing along ideas that seem to be generative but that were actually meant to foreclose the very possibilities that were developed by the Left in the interwar period and carried on in anti-colonial liberation moments of the ’60s and ’70s. If we take the language of “rupture,” for example, it would be a way not only of summoning new ways of thinking, but also of severing theory from the important experiences of our rich past.

**FELSCH:** What would you suggest instead?

**BRENNAN:** For one, you can’t really effectively counter neoliberalism today without a notion of

humanism, the notion that the human being is somehow stunted, even eviscerated, by the policies of neoliberalism. We need to talk about the importance of humanities as the carrying forward of values – this, so that it is not merely consigned to the interest of the elite who can afford to go to the universities, where they can read books, become well-rounded people, and achieve *Bildung*. In fact, what’s happening in the humanities is actually effecting, in a kind of perverse division of labor, many of the policies that are being talked about on a larger scale as these ideas find mass audiences through television and film or in advertising. Ideas from the cultural studies seminars – think of “The Matrix” – find their way into political speeches and the scripts of Hollywood. Academics may be underpaid, but we are not as marginal as it sometimes seems. Theory matters.

**FELSCH:** I see what you mean. But let me ask a critical question, one that is aimed at what I regard as the polemical thrust of your book. The French theory you depict, with its adherence to Western liberal values and its strictly anti-totalitarian attitude, has, at times, a closer semblance to the ideas of *nouveaux philosophes* such as André Glucksmann or Bernard-Henri Lévy, who came to prominence in the late ’70s, than with genuine poststructuralist authors such as Foucault or Deleuze. Is your portrait of French theory, maybe for polemical reasons, prone to an oversimplification?

**BRENNAN:** Well, I would of course object to that perception. I teach theory, am dedicated to a close familiarity with the texts of the philosophical past. I’m not one of these people who sits on the outside of theory like a journalist, carping at obscurantism. I think it’s important to read, and



to teach, Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze. And I do so critically, just as I teach Adorno and Gramsci critically as well. A polemical book? I'm not so sure. I see it as more philological than polemical, which is to say that I'm much more interested in getting down to the textual specificity of what these people said, the historical sources that they were drawing on, how they developed them or in some ways distorted them. The way that Foucault, for example, reads Nietzsche on genealogy, as I argue in "Borrowed Light," a recent book of mine: for his own reasons, Foucault is not looking too closely at the development of Nietzsche's intellectual thought, his long involvements in the field of classical textual scholarship, his philological commitments, and so he misses, for instance, that Nietzsche's term "genealogy" was already well known in Nietzsche's circles as a mode of reading ancient texts, one devised by the teacher of his teacher; Foucault, brilliantly of course, is much more interested in appropriating Nietzsche for a new way of doing history without historical actors, and for turning Nietzsche's various offensive biologisms and racialisms into a liberatory theory of the body as a form of thought and of ethical direction. This is just to say that I get into the nitty-gritty and read things in their original languages and try to be as faithful as I can, because if theory better knew the prehistory of its own formulations, wouldn't it matter to see ourselves suddenly in a relationship to ideas alien to our intentions?

Now that having been said, I do think, as Habermas long ago argued in his book "The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity," that Foucault can be understood, in some respects, as a conservative thinker, as a thinker of the political Right – and in fact, Habermas had the



Edward Said

*nouveaux philosophes* very much in mind. I'm a student of Edward Said and I was very persuaded by Said's own flight from Foucault, who, in the 1970s, influenced him greatly; by the time Said's "Orientalism" came out, however, the romance had already begun to fade – and for very specific reasons. He called Foucault, and I think I agree with him here, the "scribe of power," by which he meant that, for all the assumption that Foucault resisted official restraints on freedom, he was in service to power in ultimately disabling ways. There are many insights in Foucault, naturally, but do we really do justice by imagining that – when he was alerting us to the subtle manner by which power is disseminated, or people subjected – he is the great theorist of power? A lot of that general reasoning is much more usefully and completely developed in the writings of Bourdieu, for example, on the *habitus*, from very early on in his career; and of course, even more so in the writ-

ings of the Frankfurt School. Foucault is talking about a power so permeating that there is no way to resist it, and what's more, we all, without distinction, must in his account equally take responsibility for it. There are no guilty agents of domination, and there is no mechanism by which one can resist such an organization of power. It's a deeply quietistic way of thinking. And I think one of the reasons that Foucault's own discourse has been so powerful is because he is indifferent to others' power. His ability to make us indifferent is rewarded by those in power. Is this not a conservative position?

**FELSCH:** What about Deleuze?

**BRENNAN:** Deleuze? I confess that I am antagonistic, in part because – like Lyotard and Kristeva – I find it not unfair to see him as an old-fashioned anti-communist. I really agree with Badiou here, who in his book on Deleuze portrays him to be quite tyrannical in the institutional setting of the university, where he sought to marginalize and dismiss those on the left of theory. But in my view, there is an even more significant problem with his epistemological presuppositions, which can be put this way: he mistakes nonsense for creativity. He acts as though one can think outside of inherited categories, that one can arbitrarily invent languages without a referent. The idea is that to deny the reality of the real is a form of political insurrection, as though the real might degrade the political as such and prevent new utopian spaces from being carved out. This way of thinking is not so directly related to neoliberal or right-wing thinking, perhaps, but it is politically problematic. His own spin on the death of the author is to say that he does not have an individuality and that it

is rather nature speaking through him. But who could contest, then, his wild neologisms or his mischievous misreadings of Spinoza since it is not he who is speaking? We would have to contest nature itself to contest him.

Deleuze in this way takes an entire generation eager to make a difference in its fight against this neoliberal dominance, and puts them out of commission. So in that more mediated sense, one could say this is a deeply problematic gesture. But I don't want to be misunderstood. Deleuze and Foucault are important, and I do think that their work has inspired some terrific writing by others – even if there are a great deal more who gullibly reproduce the former's worst features. But it is the poststructuralists' intellectual sources, and the contexts of the larger conservative shift following the fall of the Wall and US imperial dominance during their careers, that establish a continuity in their positions with those of the political Right. What's more, institutionally speaking, they are still being taken seriously within the academy well past their "sell-by date"; I think it has a lot to do with the fact that they offer a form of dissidence that is completely containable within liberal democratic values.

**FELSCH:** I'm interested in the wider historical horizon of your argument. It would seem that you accuse French theory, mainly due to its aesthetic twist, of articulating dissidence and compliance towards Western liberal values at the same time. Similar accusations have been voiced toward the Romantic movement in Germany in the late 1700s and early 1800s. Is French theory, in essence, a romantic rebellion, and does it therefore end up in the aporias of every romantic rebellion in modernity?

**BRENNAN:** I would say no. Where I'm coming from is in part similar to, and draws some of its inspiration from, people like Benjamin and Lukács, also Ernst Bloch, who were all quite openly hostile toward Romanticism. But there are fundamental differences. My position has more to do with identifying theory with the particular kind of aesthetic revolt against Romanticism represented by somebody like Baudelaire. Baudelaire talks a lot about the migratory intellectual who cannot be pinned down, right? The one who embraces oblivion. And it's primarily a modernist sensibility in a Baudelairean, Mallarmé-like sense, that, I think, is the model on which theory intellectuals are now basing themselves. What characterizes them? Well, instead of the effusive harmony with organic nature found in the romantic individual, we find, here, something very different: an emphasis on the importance of not replicating the abuses of power by never possessing power. We are not with nature but an indifferent part of it.

The effort to undo the arrogant rationalism of the Enlightenment by eliminating general understanding and civic improvement by arguing that these goals have produced tyrannical political regimes: that is the sort of move we find in theory. That might sound like Romanticism, but it is really not. Instead we have what I call "running and dodging," which one finds very explicitly in Derrida's work but also very differently in Jacques Rancière's — this set-up where the telos of one's argument is precisely not to have a position. The ambiguity is no longer the recognition that problems are complex or elusive, but that ambiguity is the ethical directive of the entire operation, and to preserve ambiguity is precisely what one is seeking to do. The telos is to have no telos, to

be taking a positionless position. So intellectual sophistication comes to be associated with not knowing anything.

And the radical position, a posthumanist position in this case, which is one of the more recent turns from that ontological shift I described earlier, is to make the alienation of the human a positive virtue. I call this ethical position "green misanthropy," and I think that these positions are the ones that better characterize the current moment: the resistance to critical thought, the feeling that to criticize is to be polemical, and to be polemical is to foreclose possibilities of meaning. Indeed, to interpret things, to attempt to find the meaning of a work of art or social practice, is already a kind of tyrannical gesture within this way of thinking. The highroad is to say "I'm not arguing with somebody. I'm putting pressure on them." These infinitely repeated metaphors of in-betweenness are internalized by people in theory and the humanities as though they were rulebooks for proper behavior, and one is thought to be sophisticated only if they embrace these postures.

**FELSCH:** Of course I would like to elaborate here, but let me come back to our earlier discussion of the contemporary situation. Generally, we tend to think that postmodernism did away with the *grands récits* of Hegelian discourse. You, on the other hand, would say that it only cut off the left Hegelian tradition and that now we are in a situation, since Fukuyama, since the '90s, where Hegel has effectively been allocated to the right wing. Is that still the case? Is a) the idea of the "end of history" still a dominant right-wing form of Hegelian thought? And is b) the future of theory, of dissent, and of critical thinking somehow



Demonstranten / Protesters in Bishkek, Kirgisistan / Kyrgyzstan, März / March 2005

necessarily connected to the vacant position of left Hegelian thought?

**BRENNAN:** I guess my short answer would be “yes.” The conditions that I described in 2006 in this respect are still very much on the agenda. But since I wrote that book there have been a number of very visible attempts to return to the left Hegelian tradition, for example in the work of Susan Buck-Morss, or of Žižek, of course, and Fredric Jameson, Kevin Anderson, and many others. This is also very much a part of the current thinking in radical geography and ethnography circles, and so on. This rediscovery is, as I see it, a continuity rather than a rupture, a carrying-on of something that never left, even if it has been denied, or transgressed by those – one thinks of Judith Butler, for example – whose intellectual formation (like all of ours to a certain extent) is unthinkable outside of Hegelian leads. It’s about how a position of philosophical speculation can directly engage with a politics having to do with

organizations, movements, labor, corporations, and the state. The great idealist and metaphysician, Hegel is really the materialist here: the speculative philosopher who says that the big questions (What can we know? Why are we here? What is the right thing to do?) are only answerable if we bring philosophy into the vexed world of social antagonisms, historical conflicts, and economics. In “Wars of Position,” I focus on this problem of seeing statelessness as a virtue, as so much “left” theory has: how, in making no claims upon a state, it’s considered to be a more contemporary form of politics. We see this again in the writing of the Italian autonomists, of Negri, Virno, and all the others in the Nietzschean wake of Mario Tronti who are trying to argue in terms of a multitude, a group of people who cannot really be defined. These people possess no class identity; they do not directly communicate with one another but somehow exert their will by a political pressure via some kind of redefined subjectivity. It is just unclear to me how the autonomists

perceive this to be happening – but that’s their argument, an aesthetic one ultimately.

**FELSCH:** You also make a strong case for dialectics.

**BRENNAN:** Yes. Left Hegelianism also has to do with taking philosophy to the street, with the dynamic interplay between subject and object. And that’s a note I would like to strike here: that I’m not making a claim for a practice absent of theory. Contemporary (selective) theories target dialectical thought the most. The notion of historical contradiction, of the possibility that one (to take a very specific historical contradiction) could be subjectively on the left and yet espouse positions that were effectively right wing – this is precisely what Gramsci was talking about under the rubric of “transformism,” where political formations under the pressure of events begin to take positions associated with their antagonists without recognizing that they are doing so. I think that the “end of history” idea launched by a famous right Hegelian like Fukuyama is precisely the belief, perhaps shamefaced, among the majority of those on the cultural Left within the university. They accept that position, whereas the dialectical view would be that capitalism is transcendable, and that the quietism of the prediction of the end of history is, in fact, part of the war. So we ensure defeat by an oppressive and wholly one-sided utopianism that is indistinguishable from what neoliberals call “realism.”

My position, and again I don’t think I’m alone in this, is that in spite of the collapse of historical communism, there are, in the world of current political struggles in places like Kyrgyzstan, the Ukraine, and in parts of Nepal and the Indian

state of West Bengal, revolutionary movements that are following patterns very similar to the kinds of conflicts that we’ve had before. And there is really no other choice than to conceive of the struggle we have against neoliberalism in terms of those older contradictions that existed prior to the rise of poststructuralism, prior to the rise of postmodernism, prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Right certainly never lost its focus on taking over the state, has it? It seems to me that we have to find our way back, back to the continuities with the past that exist today. The very same set of struggles and the same contradictions persist – and yet we are stymied on account of certain theories that are preventing us from getting out.

**FELSCH:** That is a good closing statement, thank you very much.